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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a theory of choices that are influenced by the psychological
state in which the decision is taken. We wish to avoid as much as possible to commit
to any specific psychological phenomenon. To do so, we imagine that an agent makes
decisions by looking at the alternatives as carriers of attributes, or properties. This is
fairly standard and is consistent with the Lancaster [36] tradition of consumer theory,
with modern approaches to empirical demand analysis (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes [6]) and with other abstract modern theories of choice (e.g. Dietrich and List
[15]).
What gives leverage to our theory is the assumption that properties are looked at
sequentially by the agent. For example, when searching for a restaurant, the agent may
first check only the restaurants that are nearby, then focus on the French ones among
these, then see whether there is any nearby French with acceptable prices, and so on.
In general, following a list of desirable properties, the agent progressively eliminates
at each stage alternatives that do not possess the relevant property, until a set of ac-
ceptable alternatives is found.1 This is a case of ‘sequentially rationalisable choice’
(Manzini and Mariotti [41]) and we showed in Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti [40]
(henceforth MMM) that the decisions resulting from this type of procedure are indis-
tinguishable from those of a standard utility maximising agent. In other words, MMM
cannot explain any violation of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Thus,
while it has the methodological value of providing a procedural foundation for utility
maximisation, the MMM model does not go beyond the standard model in terms of
the phenomena it can explain. In this paper, we extend the explanatory power of the
MMM model by dropping the assumption that the order in which the properties are
applied is fixed. So, to continue with the restaurant example, we allow the agent to
consider as the most urgent property sometimes price, sometimes the type of cuisine,
and sometimes the location, as well as to have sometimes more drive for one type of
cuisine and sometimes for others. Or, we allow an investor to sometimes look first at
the safety features of an investment and some other times (perhaps in an irrationally
exuberant mood) to consider the maximum return as the most important property. In
this way, while obtaining a theory that is not vacuous, we are able to capture inter-
esting types of ‘non-standard’ behaviour that are determined by a psychological state,
1See Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti [40] for a discussion of the psychological foundations of this
procedure.
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modelled as the relative urgency of the properties sought by the agent. Furthermore,
the theory becomes sufficiently flexible to be applied to economics settings in a fruit-
ful way, explaining some observed anomalies that are difficult to accommodate in the
standard utility maximisation model.
That the psychological state of the agent has an effect on the cognitive process un-
derlying choice is intuitive and is an increasingly accepted feature of economic models.
For example, the relationship between ‘mood’ and choice is documented in an impres-
sively large body of empirical evidence from psychology and economics.2 In the large
literature on menu choice (Kreps [34]; Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [14]), an agent
anticipates being in one of different preference determining states. And there exist
several models of the effects on choice of specific psychological states, such as ‘antic-
ipatory feelings’ (Caplin and Leahy [8]). In the MMM model the cognitive process
underlying choice is summarised by the order in which properties are applied. There-
fore, if it is granted that psychological states do matter, it is natural to take the order of
the relevant properties as a variable rather than a fixed element of the model.
One of our main aims is to arrive at a general, flexible framework to incorporate the
effects of the disparate psychological factors affecting choice, with a view to teasing out
the empirical restrictions entailed by the dependence on these factors per se (that is, in-
dependently of the specificity of the factor). One ‘natural’ approach might appear that
of using a state dependent utility function. However, one difficulty of this approach
is that it has an empty empirical content when states depend on choice menus (see
section 6). For this reason, while still avoiding to commit to a specific interpretation of
what a psychological state is, we use the richer primitives of the MMM model rather
than the behaviourally equivalent utility maximisation model. By doing so, we ob-
tain a framework in which behaviour always presents systematic patterns even when
subject to psychological influences. Such patterns can be identified by means of direct
observation of choice data, through tests that are simple variations of standard tests in
revealed preference theory.
We call mindset the set of properties considered in general by the agent, ‘the things
that make the agent tick’. A glutton would have to change his mindset/personality, not
just the contingent factors affecting choice, to start paying attention to the fat content of
his diet. A foolhardy agent will always ignore the safety aspects of his options. While
the mindset is fixed throughout all choices, how the relevant properties are ranked
2A sample of publications is: Capra [10], Erber et al. [19], Ifcher and Shaghaghi [26] Isen [27], Kahn
and Isen [28], Kirchsteiger et al. [30], Mayer et al. [38], Mittal and Ross [47], Nygren [48], Nygren et al.
[49], Oswald et al. [50], Thayer [54], [55], Williams and Voon [56]
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with respect to one another can vary. We call the order in which properties are con-
sidered a state. This methodology allows us to describe an agent with a recognisable
identity (in the form of a fixed set of values) who makes different choices in different
conditions: an alternative with the property that is top in a state might be selected in
that state, but discarded in a state that prioritises different properties that this alterna-
tive does not possess.
To give a flavour of how the model works, the investor depicted in Figure 1 can be
in two states, bearish or bullish. His mindset consists of just two ‘threshold’ proper-
ties: minimum acceptable return and maximum acceptable risk. In a bearish state, the
investor puts risk limitation at the forefront and selects portfolio b, which is the only
one of the two to have the relevant property, while in a bullish state she looks first for
a minimum return, selecting portfolio a.
Figure 1: Bulls and bears
This cognitive process under-
lying choice extends to situa-
tions with more numerous and
more complex properties.
How are states determined?
We consider two models that
capture two distinct plausible
possibilities. In the first model, a
state is menu driven, that is, trig-
gered by the menu under con-
sideration. This is a most natural
situation in consumer choice, as
sellers may and do manipulate
menus to their advantage (e.g.
using “asymmetric dominance”
effects), but it may occur in other
contexts too. For example, if an agent finds it costly to contemplate a menu before
selecting an alternative from it (e.g. Ergin and Sarver [20]), menus with different con-
templation costs may induce different states.
In the second model, a state is environment driven, that is, determined by factors ex-
ogenous to the choice menu, and the agent is observed to make multiple choices from
the same menu in different states. In figure 1 imagine that a climate of ‘irrational exu-
berance’ (a memorable instance of a collective psychological state) triggers an appetite
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for risk and hence makes the ‘high return property’ the more urgent one. The environ-
mental state model assumes that, as in most cases outside controlled experiments, we
cannot observe the state of an agent making a choice.
We show that the model in which states are menu driven is equivalent to choice
data satisfying a single property (Togetherness). An interesting aspect of this property
is that it is intermediate in strength between two textbook properties: it is weaker than
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) and stronger than Sen’s property β
(section 3). Concretely, think of a competitive consumer choosing from budgets. To-
getherness says that all those bundles that are acceptable at some budget either remain
(if still available) all acceptable or become all unacceptable following a price/income
change. Togetherness implies in particular that an agent who reveals himself willing
to engage in a sequence of trades, say leading from x to y, is also willing to engage in
a direct trade between x and y. So in particular a welfare planner can still use such
‘revealed indifferences’ as a guidance, as he would with a standard agent.
The second model, where states are environment driven, admits multiple obser-
vations of choice from the same menu, made in different states. We show that the
set of possible choice observations (in all possible states) fails Independence of Irrele-
vant Alternatives and other consistency properties, yet is again fully characterised by
a single property (state dependent WARP, or sd-WARP) that is intermediate between
two standard properties: it is weaker than WARP and stronger than Sen’s Property α.
Once again, consider a competitive consumer. sd-WARP states in that context that if a
bundle is always (i.e. in any state) rejected at some prices and income (p, M), then it
is always rejected at any other budget for which all the bundles demanded (in some
state) at (p, M) are affordable (section 4).
An advantage of the axiomatic approach is that it automatically generates a recipe
for direct empirical tests of the theory. Secondly, it permits simple and sharp be-
havioural distinctions between our theory and other axiomatic theories of psycholog-
ically driven choice, even using a very limited range of menus and observations. In
this vein, we show how to distinguish between our model and a model of indecisive
behaviour (section 6.3).
Though abstract, our framework is workable and can yield novel economic in-
sights. In section 5 we specialise the models to use them in a specific economic settings.
We look at a long-standing debate on labour supply responses by workers who (like
taxi-drivers) can choose their supply in a non-lumpy way.3 Even a very stripped down
3Some of the relevant literature is cited in section 5.
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version of the model (that postulates ‘target-driven’ behaviour as suggested in the em-
pirical literature) can accommodate the ‘anomaly’ of negative wage elasticities. The
new key insight we provide lies in the asymmetry between income targets, which can
be ‘unrealistic’, and leisure targets, which have a physical bound (there are so many
hours in a day). This interplay means in the model that workers can display a whole
range of wage elasticities depending on the magnitude of wage changes and inde-
pendently of any role of expectations (which conversely play a key role in reference-
dependent explanations). This application also yields two novel empirically testable
predictions. Similar simplifications of the theory can be easily applied to saving deci-
sions and consumer theory.
2 Mindset and states
Fix a finite set of alternatives X. Given the collection Σ of all nonempty subsets of X,
a choice function is a correspondence c that associates with each A ∈ Σ (a menu) a
nonempty set c(A) ⊆ A, the agent’s observed selection from A. To build a model of
state dependent choice, we begin by assuming, as in Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti
[40] (MMM), that the agent makes choices by sequentially going through a checklist of
‘properties’ of alternatives (properties are intended as synonymous with ‘attributes’).
At each step, he discards the alternatives that lack the relevant property. In spite of
it being procedural (it is a particular case of procedures such as sequential rationalis-
ability as in Manzini and Mariotti [41] and those in Apesteguia and Ballester [4]), this
decision model is shown in MMM to be equivalent to ordinary preference maximisa-
tion: an agent has a checklist if and only if he maximises a preference relation. Any
checklist corresponds to a preference, and vice versa. However the checklist model has
richer primitives than ordinary preference maximisation. This feature permits to dis-
tinguish, unlike a preference, between the more stable traits of the agent’s personality
(mindset), and the more variable aspects (states).
We identify a property with the set of alternatives that possess that property. So
formally a property is a subset P ⊆ X, and we say that x has property P whenever
x ∈ P. E.g. the property ‘sweet’ consists of all the objects in X which are sweet. A
mindset Γ ⊆ 2X\∅ is a set of mutually distinct properties. A mindset Γ is nested if for
all P, Q ∈ Γ we have either P ⊆ Q or Q ⊆ P. Given a mindset Γ, a state is a strict linear
order < of Γ.
In the revealed preference tradition, we assume throughout that the state itself in
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which a choice is made is not necessarily observable: only the resulting choice is.
3 The state is determined by the menu
In our first model the state is triggered by the menu. Multiple choices from a menu
are allowed, and they are interpreted as being made always in the same state (the one
triggered by the menu itself). Given a mindset Γ and a menu A ∈ Σ, denote by <A
the state induced by A (which we refer to as ‘a state for A’). Denote by PA0 the first
property in state <A (the <A −least element of Γ).4
A menu checklist is a pair
(
Γ, {<A}A∈Σ
)
of a mindset and a collection of states,
one for each menu. Given A ∈ Σ and a menu checklist (Γ, {<A}A∈Σ), we can define
inductively a series of ’survivor sets’:
SA
(
PA0 ,<A
)
= A
and
For all P ∈ Γ\PA0 : SA (P,<A) =

⋂
Q<AP
SA (Q,<A) ∩ P if
⋂
Q<AP
SA (Q,<A) ∩ P 6= ∅⋂
Q<AP
SA (Q,<A) otherwise
That is, when facing the menu A, the agent’s state for that menu identifies the order
of the properties in the checklist. The agent scans the checklist, and when considering
each property he only retains the alternatives which have that property, if any. Other-
wise he retains all the alternatives that have survived until that stage. Then the agent
moves to next stage. When convenient we omit denoting the linear order in the sets
SA (P,<A) and simply write SA (P).
Definition 1 A choice function c on Σ is a menu driven state dependent choice if there
exists a menu checklist
(
Γ, {<A}A∈Σ
)
such that for all A ∈ Σ, for some property P ∈ Γ,
SA(P) = SA(Q) for all Q ∈ Γ with P <A Q
c(A) = SA(P) (1)
4While in this paper we confine ourselves to finite sets, the definitions are written so as to immedi-
ately extend to the infinite cases.
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In words, a menu driven state dependent choice is such that all those alternatives
that are chosen from a menu are in the ‘last’ survival set constructed on the basis of the
relevant state for that menu.
While each menu triggers a different order in which the various properties are con-
sidered, MMM consider checklists that are independent of the menu. A choice function
c on Σ has a checklist (Γ,<) if it is a menu driven state dependent choice with menu
checklist
(
Γ, {<A}A∈Σ
)
such that<A=<B=< for all A, B ∈ Σ. It turns out that a check-
list expresses the standard notion of rationality in economics, preference maximisation.
A choice function c maximises a preference if there exists a weak order5 % on X such
that, for all A ∈ Σ, c (A) = {x : x % y for all y ∈ A}:
Proposition 1 (MMM, [40]): A choice function c has a checklist if and only if it maximises a
preference.6
A choice function may be a menu driven state dependent choice even if it has no
checklist (see appendix 1). In light of the above proposition, this means that the model
we propose can explain behaviour that is not preference maximising. The following
example illustrates:
Example 1 A consumer enters an ‘exuberant’ state when he faces large menus or menus com-
posed entirely of luxury items, but is in a thrifty state when a thrifty item is available in a
small menu. As a consequence he will for instance choose an expensive food item from a hefty
restaurant list, and a modest entree from a shorter one. Formally, let X = {x, y, z}, where x
and y are luxury items, z is thrifty, and only the grand menu is large. So
c (X) = c ({x, y}) = {x, y} and c ({x, z}) = c ({y, z}) = {z}
The choice function c cannot maximise any weak order (c (X) = {x, y} would imply x % z
while c ({x, z}) = {z} would imply z  x) and therefore by Proposition 1 it cannot have
a checklist. Nevertheless it is a menu driven state dependent choice with the menu checklist
({{x, y} , {z}} ,<A) and states {x, y} <A {z} for A ∈ {X, {x, y}} and {z} <A {x, y} for
A ∈ {{x, z} , {y, z}}.
We also make at this stage an observation that may appear surprising: in spite of
the fact that each checklist corresponds to a preference, it is not necessarily the case that
5A weak order is a a complete transitive relation.
6This result is proved in MMM in greater generality than for the domain considered here. The con-
nections with the classical theory of lexicographic preferences are explained in that paper.
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an agent who maximises a menu dependent preference is captured by a menu driven
state dependent choice. This implies that the model does have empirical restrictions
(unlike the model of menu dependent preferences). Details are in section 6.
3.1 Menu driven state dependence may not manifest itself in be-
haviour
State variations are not necessarily expressed in observable choice behaviour. In par-
ticular, a necessary condition for state changes to be observable is that the properties
cannot be ranked as more or less permissive, i.e., they are not nested.
Example 2 There are two properties you look at when selecting from a restaurant menu: ‘rec-
ommended by a friend’ and cheapness (all dishes are sufficiently appealing). The rice dish (r) has
been recommended by a friend, while steak (s) and tacos (t) have not been recommended. Rice
and tacos are cheap and steak is not. In a trusting state (the recommendation first springs to
mind) rice is selected over both tacos and steak, and tacos are selected over fish. But evidently in
a conservative state (cheapness first), you would make exactly the same choices! (Rice and tacos
survive the first cheapness test and then rice is selected on the basis of the recommendation).
Formally,
c ({r, s, t}) = c ({s, r}) = c ({r, t}) = r and c ({s, t}) = t
and the data are explained by the mindset {{r} , {r, t}} both in the state {r} <A {r, t} for all
A and in the ‘opposite’ state {r, t} <A {r} for all A.
This fact holds in general: when the mindset is nested, the state does not affect
choice, an agent affected by states behaves exactly like one that is not (but has the
same mindset).
Proposition 2 Let c be a menu driven state dependent choice with nested mindset. Then c
maximises a preference.
(The proofs of all propositions and claims, trivial and less trivial, are in the ap-
pendix). A leading example of nested properties is provided by a textbook utility max-
imiser who uses as properties the upper contour sets of the utility function. This case
has a natural procedural interpretation: the agent is in fact a satisficer who at each
stage s sets a threshold numerical satisfaction target ts. At stage s, the agent keeps
only the satisficing alternatives (those that meet the target ts), if any, and otherwise he
9
keeps all of them. In the next stage he revises the satisfaction threshold. There is no
need to specify the revision rule, precisely because the properties are nested. The best
alternatives in a menu will never be eliminated: if, when considering a property P, the
set of survivors from the previous stages contains some alternatives that are in P, then
the best alternatives must be among them. The state, in this interpretation, manifests
itself in the initial property t1 and the revision rule adopted: sometimes the agent will
start with ambitious targets, and sometimes with more modest ones; sometimes he
will react to the lack of satisfactory alternatives by radically revising down the target,
and sometimes he will hold firm. This agent is procedural as well as subject to state
changes but his choice behaviour never appears to an external observer to be swayed
by this instability!
But the invariance of choice to state changes does not necessarily rest on nested
states. In specific economic settings there are natural non-nested properties that - at
least within a parameter range - generate choice invariance.
Figure 2: State dependent intertemporal
consumption
In Figure 2 a saver in the
standard consumption today and
tomorrow (ct, ct+1) space con-
siders first two properties: in-
tertemporal consumption smooth-
ing (S, the 450 line) and satisfac-
tion of immediate urges (all con-
sumption patterns to the right of
the vertical line, the set T). For
the interest rate indicated (and
all those sufficiently close to it),
choice is invariant to whether S
is applied before T or viceversa,
and is always the point x.
For much lower interests
rates, however, the state would
become relevant. The depen-
dence of the relevance of states on economic parameters in examples of this kind can
be exploited to derive interesting economic implications and explain some anomalies.
We elaborate on this point in section 5.
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3.2 The observable behavioural implications of menu driven state
dependence
Once we step aside of the special cases studied in the previous section, however, menu
driven state dependence does effect choices that cannot be rationalised in a standard
manner.
Example 3 Rice (r) and tacos (t) are both choosable when steak (s) is also available, but rice
alone is chosen over tacos when these are the only two available dishes. Formally
c ({r, s, t}) = {r, t} and c ({r, t}) = {r}
The choice from {r, t} implies that, if there existed a menu checklist for c, then its mindset
would contain a property P which ‘separates’ r and t, i.e. r ∈ P and t /∈ P. But then, whatever
the state, such a property would sooner or later also separate r and t in {r, s, t}, contradicting
r, t ∈ c ({r, s, t}).
The reasoning in the above example suggests a necessary property:
Togetherness: If an alternative x is rejected from a menu from which another alterna-
tive y is chosen, then x cannot be chosen when y is chosen. Formally, for all A, B ∈ Σ:
[x ∈ A\c (A) , y ∈ c (A) , y ∈ c (B)]⇒ x /∈ c (B).
This property is equivalent to saying that if x and y are both chosen from a menu,
then from any other menu x and y are either both chosen or both rejected, hence the
name Togetherness. It is intermediate in strength between two classical revealed pref-
erence properties: the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) and property β.
These are defined as follows:
WARP: If an alternative x is rejected from a menu from which another alternative y
is chosen, then x cannot be chosen when y is available. Formally: For all A, B ∈ Σ:
[x ∈ A\c (A) , y ∈ c (A) , y ∈ B]⇒ x /∈ c (B).
Property β: If an alternative x is rejected from a menu from which another alternative
y is chosen, then x cannot be chosen from a smaller menu from which y is chosen.
Formally, for all A, B ∈ Σ: [B ⊂ A, x ∈ A\c (A) , y ∈ c (A) , y ∈ c (B)]⇒ x /∈ c (B).
These axioms share the same conclusion as Togetherness, but Togetherness reaches
it from a weaker (resp. stronger) premise than Property β (resp. WARP).
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While apparently weak, Togetherness is fairly restrictive. For example, beside being
stronger than Property β as noted, it is also (strictly) stronger than a natural variant
of WARP introduced by Ehlers and Sprumont [17], which requires that if the agent
chooses x and rejects y from a menu, then he cannot choose y and reject x from another
menu.7
It turns out that Togetherness fully characterises our model.
Proposition 3 A choice function is a menu driven state dependent choice if and only if it
satisfies Togetherness.
This result clarifies the sense in which our model yields testable conditions for state
dependent behaviour. An agent, no matter how state dependent, will never be ob-
served to accept two alternatives from one menu while rejecting only one of the two
from another menu. And conversely, every time that this pattern is not observed we
can explain observed choices by means of the model. Suppose I’m willing to go to
the theatre or to the cinema when the only other alternatives are to work or to keep
the appointment with the dentist, but choose to keep the appointment with the dentist
when the other alternatives are cinema, theatre, work, and a visit to a friend in the
hospital. In this example we have a violation of WARP but not of Togetherness: the
switch from the choice of cinema or theatre to the choice of seeing the dentist can be
imputed to a shift in state. It could be, for instance, that the presence of a friend in the
hospital, while not providing me with a sufficiently strong reason to visit her, puts me
in a pensive mood, focussing my mind away from entertainment choices.8
Any single-valued choice function satisfies Togetherness, so Proposition 3 does not
impose testable restrictions on this type of data. However, the result applies to the
most abstract version of the theory, with no restriction on how states may depend
on menus. It is not difficult to build specialisations of the theory which are restric-
tive even for single-valued choice data. A first example comes from Proposition 2: if
properties are nested, the theory can be falsified by single-valued choice data, through
violations of WARP. A second quite natural example is a generalisation of the well-
known ‘Luce and Raiffa’s dinner’, whereby the presence of frog’s legs on a menu trig-
gers a change in preference. Suppose that a menu may or may not contain a ‘trigger’
7The easy proof of this assertion is left as an exercise for the reader.
8As it often happens, choice data alone cannot be the ultimate arbiter in the selection of the model.
For example, ‘rationalisation’ in the sense of Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [11] could be the
‘true’ explanation of the behaviour just described. Context and non-choice data will help model selec-
tion.
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alternative that alters the psychological state (beside the Luce and Raiffa dinner ex-
ample, the presence of an expensive bottle of wine may make a diner more inclined
to splash out, or noticing a high paying job advertisement may put a job applicant in
the mood for more ambitious applications). Given an alternative t ∈ X define a trig-
ger checklist as a menu checklist (Γ, {<t,<o}) with two states, with state <t applying
to all menus A such that t ∈ A, and the ‘ordinary’ state <o applying whenever the
decision maker is choosing from a menu which does not contain the trigger alterna-
tive (e.g. we can see <o as a ‘neutral’ state and <t as an ‘excited’ state). Call a menu
driven state dependent choice with a trigger checklist a trigger state dependent choice.
There are single-valued choice functions which are not trigger state dependent choice.
Consider for instance the choice function c defined on X = {x, y, w, z} as c (X) = w;
c (xyw) = x = c (xwz); c (xyz) = y = c (ywz); c (yz) = z. Recall that each checklist
determines a preference order. Whichever order is applied to X must rank w above
any other alternative; consequently a different order must be applied to all three-sets.
However c (xyw) = x = c (xwz) implies that x ranks above all other alternatives, while
c (xyz) = y = c (ywz) implies that y ranks above all other alternatives, a contradiction.
In general, it easy to prove9 that a choice function is a trigger state dependent choice
if and only if it there exists an alternative that partitions the domain in two subsets such
that WARP applies to each subdomain.10
The relation ≈ introduced in the proof of Proposition 3 can be interpreted as ‘be-
havioural indifference’: x ≈ y requires x and y to be never separated by choice. A menu
driven state dependent agent satisfies the transitivity of the behavioural indifference≈.
So in particular he is willing to carry out in one step a trade, such as between x and y,
when he has implicitly (via ≈) revealed his willingness to carry out a sequence of pair-
wise trades leading from x to y. Moreover he will be willing to carry out explicitly the
implicit sequence of trades in any order. This is because the implicit trades which are
acceptable to a menu driven state dependent agent are all and only the trades between
alternatives that have exactly the same properties, and ‘having the same properties’ is
a symmetric and transitive relation.11 Of course, alternatives can share the same rele-
9The proof is available from the authors.
10Formally, c must satisfy the following weakening of WARP, where for any alternative x ∈ X we
define Σx = {S ⊆ X : x ∈ S} and Σ¬x = Σ\Σx:
t-WARP (trigger WARP): There exists t ∈ X such that for i = x,¬x: For all A, B ∈ Σi:
[x ∈ A\c (A) , y ∈ c (A) , y ∈ B]⇒ x /∈ c (B).
11Mandler [39] shows how indifference can be distinguished from incompleteness by observing the
trades an agent is willing to carry out.
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vant properties and be physically different: for example, walking, cycling and taking
a bus can all belong to a ‘cheap leisurely means of transport’ behavioural indifference
class for an agent.
These observations are important for welfare analysis. Like in the standard case, a
planner faced with the task of choosing between implementing x or y may let himself
be guided by the sequences of behavioural indifferences of a possibly menu driven
state dependent agent without fear of hurting the agent’s welfare. Unlike standard
welfare analysis, the planner can no longer always use as a guide for welfare judge-
ments the behavioural strict preferences if he suspects that the agent is menu driven
state dependent. Nevertheless, some choices may provide information about strict
welfare judgements. In the previous example, work is never chosen, whereas all other
three alternatives which are available in different states (and we know that the state
has changed across menus since WARP has been violated) are chosen under at least
one state. We deduce that, whatever the hierarchy of importance among the properties
sought in the alternatives, work never offers a crucial property that some other alter-
native does not offer, and there are crucial properties that other alternatives offer but
work does not. Work appears thus a good candidate to be declared welfare inferior to
the other three alternatives available in both states. We cannot make the same inference
regarding visiting a friend in the hospital, since such a choice was not available in the
first state. This type of reasoning is a variant of Bernheim and Rangel’s [5] approach
to ‘behavioural welfare economics’ (see Manzini and Mariotti [43] for a discussion on
welfare and bounded rationality. See also Masatlioglu et al. [46] and Rubinstein and
Salant [52]).
4 The state is determined by the environment
In our second model the state does not depend on the menu, but we allow several
observations of choice from an A, each time in a different (unidentifiable) state.12 A
mindset is as before a set Γ of properties, and a state is a linear order<m of Γ. We allow
for the possibility that each observation is itself multivalued.
Specifically, let M be the set of states in which any menu A is considered. A pair(
Γ, {<m}m∈M
)
is called an environmental checklist. Let γ (A,<m) denote the choice
from A in state<m∈ M. Analogously to before, γ (A,<m) is determined by a sequence
12As in the previous section, our setup is static. Laibson [35] studies a dynamic model of what we
would call an ‘environment driven state’ triggered by binary cues.
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of successive eliminations. Denote by Pm0 the first property in state <m. The survivor
sets are defined by
SA (Pm0 ,<m) = A
and
For all P ∈ Γ\Pm0 : SA (P,<m) =

⋂
Q<mP
SA (Q,<m) ∩ P if
⋂
Q<AP
SA (Q,<m) ∩ P 6= ∅⋂
Q<mP
SA (Q,<m) otherwise
Then, for all A ∈ Σ, γ(A,<m) is defined as follows:
γ(A, < m) = SA(P,<m), where P ∈ Γ is such that (2)
SA(P, < m) = SA(Q,<m) for all Q ∈ Γ with P <m Q
We begin by noting that the functions γ (.,<m), which describe the observations
conditional on one state, are consistent in the sense that they satisfy IIA:
IIA: If some alternatives of a larger menu are still available in a smaller menu, the
alternatives chosen from the smaller menu are the available ones which are chosen
from the larger menu. Formally, for all A, B ∈ Σ: [A ⊂ B, c (B) ∩ A 6= ∅] ⇒ c (A) =
c (B) ∩ A.
Then:
Proposition 4 For all <m∈ M, γ (.,<m) satisfies IIA.
This result is implied by Proposition 1 and standard properties of preference max-
imisation, but we also give a direct proof in the Appendix.13 Unfortunately, Propo-
sition 4 is often not of practical use: although each γ (.,<m) satisfies IIA, the specific
state in which choice was made is most likely unobservable, as an external observer
can often be expected to have only choice data, not state data, available. Thus, the ob-
ject c (A) is now interpreted as the collection of all the choices the agent makes from A
in all possible unobservable states:
13While we are working for simplicity in the full domain, so that IIA and WARP are equivalent, the
result is independent of this domain restriction.
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Definition 2 A choice function c is an environment driven state dependent choice if there
exists an environmental checklist
(
Γ, {<m}m∈M
)
such that for all A ∈ Σ
c (A) =
⋃
<m∈M
γ (A,<m) for all A ∈ Σ
Abstracting from the fact that the choices γ are generated here by a checklist and not
by a utility, this framework parallels Salant and Rubinstein’s [53] ‘choice with frames’
(or Bernheim and Rangel [5] similar framework of ‘choice with ancillary conditions’),
where a choice correspondence is interpreted as including, for each A, all the single-
valued choices made from A in some frame. The definition here is similar, but we allow
the choice in a state, γ (A,<m), to be multi-valued.14 This means that, at a substantive
level, the models differ, as there may not be a one-to-one correspondence between the
frames and the states that explain a given set of observations. Details are in section 6.
4.1 Environment driven state dependence causes behaviour incon-
sistency
We search for standard ‘consistency’ properties that c may satisfy. First of all, it is
easy to show that c does not inherit IIA from the γ (.,<m). Alternatives which are
not chosen, in any state, from a larger menu, may be chosen, in some state, from a
smaller menu in which they are available. We illustrate this with an example which
shows, more specifically, that c fails to satisfy two classical basic consistency properties
implied by IIA. One is Property β already defined, and the other is:
Expansion: An alternative chosen from two menus must still be chosen when the two
menus are merged. Formally, for all A, B ∈ Σ: c (A) ∩ c (B) ⊆ c (A ∪ B).
Suppose there are three properties you look at when selecting from a restaurant
menu: recommended by a friend, cheapness, and perceived appeal. Rice and steak
have been recommended, rice and tacos are cheap, and steak and tacos are appealing.
In a trusting state you sift through the properties in this order (first recommendation,
then cheapness, then appeal). In a confident state you switch the order of the first and
last property: you prefer to rely on your own judgement and the last thing you look at
14Below (section 6) we explore the relationship with Salant and Rubinstein’s [53] in more detail. Bern-
heim and Rangel [5] also allow choice to depend on information beyond the feasible set, although their
focus is not on the properties of c but rather on the welfare inferences that could be made by observing
c.
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is friends’ recommendations.
So in a trusting state the steak, which has been recommended by a friend, is selected
over the tacos, which have not been recommended. And the steak is also selected, in a
confident state, over the rice dish, because the latter is less appealing.
However both tacos and rice are cheaper than steak. When all three dishes are
on the menu, you are never observed to select steak (in violation of Expansion and
Property β). The reason is that when you are trusting, steak and rice, which have both
been recommended, survive the first elimination round and then rice is selected on the
grounds of cheapness. And when you are confident, steak and tacos, which are both
appealing, are shortlisted, to finally select the cheap tacos. Formally:
Claim 1 c does not satisfy Expansion, nor Property β.
Obviously, since Togetherness is stronger than Property β, this result also shows
that c fails Togetherness.
4.2 Consistency of environment driven state dependent choice
We now show that environment driven state dependent behaviour is nonetheless sub-
ject to strong empirical restrictions. Of course if the mindset comprised only nested
properties, we would have a result analogous to Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 Let c be an environment driven state dependent choice with a nested mindset.
Then c maximises a weak order % on X.
Property α: All the alternatives chosen from a larger menu are still chosen when
available in a smaller menu. Formally, for all A, B ∈ Σ: [A ⊂ B, c (B) ∩ A 6= ∅] ⇒
c (B) ∩ A ⊆ c (A).
As we shall see, if c is an environment driven state dependent choice, it must satisfy
Property α. Intuitively, if in some state you pick steamed salmon from a menu, it
means that in that state steamed salmon fulfils some crucial property which the other
alternatives do not fulfil, and this will continue to be the case even in subsets of that
menu. Yet property α is not sufficient to characterise c (see appendix B.1). We need a
significantly stronger condition that must be fulfilled by an environment driven state
dependent choice:
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sd-WARP: If an alternative x is rejected from a menu A, then x is rejected from any
other menu that contains all the alternatives chosen in A. Formally, for all A, B ∈ Σ:
[x ∈ A\c (A) , c (A) ⊆ B]⇒ x /∈ c (B).
For example, if you were observed to choose sometimes seabass and sometimes a
vegetarian meal, but never salmon, from a menu, then you will not choose salmon from
any new menu that includes both seabass and the vegetarian meal. If your behaviour
is determined by a state, it is easy to understand why this must be the case. Whatever
state you are in, your choices from the old menu reveal that the first property that
discerns between salmon and seabass (resp., the vegetarian meal) is such that seabass
(resp., the vegetarian meal) has it while salmon lacks it.
WARP strengthens sd-WARP simply by replacing the entire choice set c (A) with
any alternative contained in it. For a fully rational agent any chosen element is repre-
sentative of the class of chosen elements, but not so for an environment driven state
dependent agent. Note also that sd-WARP implies Property α (see appendix B.2). The
main result of this section is:
Proposition 6 A choice function c is an environment driven state dependent choice if and only
if it satisfies sd-WARP.
Changes in mental state thus are compatible with choice exhibiting a significant de-
gree of consistency. A violation of sd-WARP informs us that the agent’s choices cannot
be explained by ‘preference maximisation plus states’. And, sd-WARP exhausts the
testable implications of environmentally induced changes in mental state. Of course,
as sd-WARP and Togetherness are logically independent conditions, so are the two
models (see appendix B.3).15
5 A short application
Our treatment has been rather abstract so far. How it could be applied to the analysis
of specific problems may be still unclear. Yet the same objection could be raised by a
beginning economics student who is taught that the standard rational consumer max-
imises preferences: the concept of preference maximisation, while testable even in its
general formulation, acquires concrete meaning only when it is applied, e.g. once a
15In appendix D we also establish, as an homage to aficionados of choice theory, a connection between
our result and an old result from the Russian school.
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quasi-concave utility function is maximised over a budget set. Our framework, while
also testable in its general formulation, offers a flexibility similar to standard prefer-
ence maximisation (to which state independent choice collapses): in the same way as
e.g. Cobb-Douglas preferences rationalise a rigid labour supply, specific mechanisms
of generating states that are appropriate for a given economic environment can help
understand the logic of our theory, how it works, and the qualitative predictions and
novel insights it can provide in the chosen settings. We pursue this point in the exer-
cise below, which uses primitives similar to those of other theories (target variables).
The different cognitive mechanism postulated by our theory accounts for the different
implications.
5.1 NYC cab drivers’ supply with target income and leisure
We consider the way in which unconstrained suppliers of labour (notably, taxi-drivers),
as opposed to agents who necessarily have ‘lumpy’ supplies (e.g. factory workers),
react to changes in wage. This is a long-standing, theoretically and empirically contro-
versial issue. Very succinctly and simplifying, a neoclassical model can accommodate a
negative labour supply elasticity only at the cost of an implausibly high income effect,
and the early empirical findings of Camerer et al. [7] indicate precisely such a negative
elasticity. This negative elasticity is informally explained with income targeting. Koszegi
and Rabin’s [33] (KR) use their reference dependence theory to explain this anomaly.
However, Farber [21] rejects (on econometric and methodological grounds) the empir-
ical finding, using a different dataset. In further work, Farber [22] formally introduces
income targeting by drivers in a structural model, but on the basis of his data attributes
low predictive power to the model. But in a recent breakthrough Crawford and Meng
[12] (CM) devise an econometric specification of KR’s theory with Farber’s data, using
income and leisure targeting and sample proxies for KR’s rational expectations targets.
This (assumed) target observability is the key to extract information from the data.
In this way CM are able to explain non-neoclassical responses provided that (1) the
gain-loss utility has a sufficiently large weight and (2) wage changes are unanticipated
(while in the other cases the model predicts the textbook implication of nonnegative
elasticity).
We apply our model to this situation as follows. We assume that the agent demands
leisure always looking first at two types of properties: an ‘income property’ requiring
income to be above a target level, and a ‘leisure property’ requiring leisure to be above
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a target level. These are very natural properties to look at, and as explained above the
existence of ‘target incomes’ or ‘target leisure levels’ has been often considered in the
relevant literature. The state determines the order in which the properties are looked
at.
At first sight, it might appear that, because our model is lexicographic (unlike mod-
els with reference dependence and targeting, which have weights and trade-offs), the
behaviour of the agent is entirely determined by the priority accorded to the two types
of properties. For example one may suppose that agents giving priority to income
react to drops in wages by increasing their labour supply, a negative elasticity that as
explained is implausible in the textbook model. But in fact our model has a richer and
more nuanced set of implications. The reason is simple. There is a qualitative differ-
ence between income properties and leisure properties. For any leisure property there
always is a feasible leisure-income combination satisfying that property.
Figure 3: Labour supply
But, on the contrary, for any
income property there is always
a sufficiently low wage such that
there is no leisure-income com-
bination satisfying that property.
This is a general observation,
about target properties: one can-
not (if he is sane) be ‘unrealis-
tic’ with an objective constraint
-like hours in a day-, but one
can be unrealistic with a subjec-
tive constraint -like how much
one thinks his work is worth.
Because of this asymmetry, de-
pending on the realisation of the wage even a state giving in principle priority to a
target income will simply force the agent to move on to consider the next property,
something that will never occur for leisure properties. Consider the situation in fig-
ure 3, depicting choices at some given wage w. The income and the leisure property,
PI and PL, respectively, determine the same set AB of acceptable choices regardless of
the order in which they are applied (we may imagine that a final selection within AB
will be determined by other properties or by random factors, but we don’t need to be
specific in this short example). Suppose now that wage drops by a large amount to
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w′ < w, as illustrated in figure 4.
Once again, the state is irrelevant: the same set of acceptable alternatives CD is
determined independently of the order, since if the income property PI is applied first
it will not have any bite. The set of acceptable choices does not contain any choice with
lower leisure than the acceptable choices at the higher wage w, and contains many
choices with higher leisure. This is broadly consistent with the effect predicted by the
textbook model and with the empirical evidence analysed in Farber [21].
However, the state becomes crucial in determining the agent response to a milder
drop in wage, to w′′ with w′ < w′′ < w, as depicted in figure 5. Here it is still possible
that the regular comparative statics result holds, if PL is applied first. Yet if the agent
is an ‘income type’ and instead applies PI first, his response to the drop in wage is to
increase labour supply to somewhere in the range corresponding to EF.
Figure 4: Labour supply and a large drop in wage Figure 5: Labour supply with a modest drop in wage
Furthermore, regardless of whether PL or PI is applied first, our model predicts that
labour supply will never range in the values corresponding to leisure levels identified
by the FC’ range in figure 5 - any contrary observation would falsify our model, and
the higher the leisure or wage threshold levels (i.e. the farther to the northeast the
intersection between the two threshold properties moves), the larger the labour supply
‘gap’.
Thus, the mechanism we have studied is consistent with textbook labour supply
responses to large wage changes, but also allows a wider range of responses to milder
wage changes, including negative wage elasticities. Negative wage elasticities are pre-
dicted when the agent targets income before leisure.
We note one interesting feature of our sketch model compared to the CM adaptation
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of KR’s reference dependent model, which also accommodates both types of effects.
In CM/KR, there is an element of rational expectations in that the reference targets
are determined endogenously and ‘correctly’ by the agent, but the anomalous supply
response can only occur for unanticipated wage changes. In our mechanism, on the
contrary, targets are exogenous unobserved variables because they are very much like pref-
erences in standard theory, that is fundamental primitives and not an additional vari-
able in a utility framework. Thus, they are not necessarily rationally determined: but,
on the other hand, the anomalous responses can occur for perfectly predicted wages
without requiring expectation errors as in the reference dependence model.
In summary, then, our analysis points to two novel implications. First, the size
of the wage change is a potentially important factor in the contrasting empirical ev-
idence. Second, if state dependence explains labour supply then this supply can be
‘behaviourally extreme’, that is, for certain values of the wage there is a range of inter-
mediate values of supply that are never chosen in any state: the worker either demands
‘a lot’ or ‘little’ labour, depending on the state. These hypotheses seem to merit further
study both empirically and theoretically.
Of course, the above is just a sketch of a complete model, but it is precisely its sim-
plicity coupled with the richness of implications that suggests its potential usefulness
in more detailed frameworks. Similar applications of the theory can be made for exam-
ple to saving decisions (along the lines of the example in section 3.1, explaining why
visceral immediate consumption impulses may become more relevant at low rates of
return on savings and why savers may be subject to behavioural swings); or to con-
sumer theory (explaining the behaviour of a ‘consumption-target driven’ consumer).
6 Related literature
6.1 Multiself models
In view of Proposition 1, using a checklist that varies with A is equivalent to maximis-
ing a weak order that depends on A. So our model of menu driven state dependent
choice may appear the same as that by Kalai et al. [29] (KRS), who assume that the
decision maker maximises a preference relation (a weak order) which depends on the
menu. But a moment’s reflection shows that the two models are in fact distinct: after
all, while our model is characterised by Togetherness, the KRS model can explain any
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choice observation.16
To understand the puzzle, since in the KRS model for any A we can simply pick
a preference that puts the choice from A in the highest indifference class in A, it may
happen that x is strictly preferred to y in A, but it is indifferent to y in another menu
B when two different preferences are applied to A and B. Therefore it may happen
that x is chosen and y is rejected from A, while both x and y are chosen from B, thus
violating Togetherness. This highlights the centrality in our model of the fixed nature of
the mindset. The fact that departures from ‘rationality’ in choice can only be attributed
to state dependence, and not to the mindset, imposes, unlike the KRS model, some
discipline on behaviour.
Similar observations hold for the recent works by Green and Hojman [24] and Am-
brus and Rozen [3]. Green and Hojman describe an agent as a probability distribution
over all possible preference orderings. Such preferences are then aggregated via a vot-
ing rule. If the voting rule satisfies a certain monotonicity property, this model can
also explain any choice behaviour. Ambrus and Rozen study a very general model of a
decision maker as a collection of utility functions (‘selves’), which encompasses many
other models in this vein. Each menu may activate a different aggregation procedure
of the various selves. This aggregation procedure is constrained to satisfy some natural
axioms, which however force the aggregation rule to incorporate some cardinal infor-
mation: this contrasts with our and the other models mentioned in this section, which
are purely ordinal. Ambrus and Rozen’s central result is that with a sufficient number
of selves any choice observation can be explained, in spite of the restrictions imposed
on the aggregation procedure. This result suggests that multiselves models need to
limit the number of allowable selves in order to exhibit observable restrictions. Re-
placing ‘selves’ with ‘states’, this intuition could also apply to our framework. Because
our analysis specifies the components of a state, one obvious way to restrict a state is
to limit the number of properties that constitute it (some environments may specify
natural restrictions). We also have noted above how the assumption of nestedness of
the states makes our model equivalent to utility maximisation.
16To be precise, KRS deal with choice functions. We are referring to the obvious extension of their
ideas to choice correspondences, in which a weak order is maximised in each menu.
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6.2 Choice with frames
As observed in section 4, the choice functions γ (.,<m) when single-valued can be in-
terpreted as choice with frames (Salant and Rubinstein [53]), where each state<m plays
the role of a specific frame. Of course, in our framework a checklist is a very different
object from a utility function, as a linear order of a fixed set of properties rather than of
alternatives. However using Proposition 1 as a bridging result, we can associate with
each <m a weak order on the set of alternatives. When the weak order is a strict linear
order, such a substitution generates a choice function that Salant and Rubinstein term
‘choice by salient consideration’ (a single-valued choice function that maximises some
frame dependent strict linear order on the alternatives). In the proof of Proposition 6
however we implicitly prove that a c with a environmental checklist can always be seen
(in our domain) as the union of single-valued choice functions. In short, then, we can
establish an observational equivalence between the choice correspondence induced by
a choice by salient consideration as frames vary, and the choice correspondence c in-
duced by γ (.,<m) as states vary. The upshot is that, as a by-product, Proposition
6 also provides a characterisation (hitherto not available) of choice correspondences
generated by salient consideration choice functions.
The fact remains, however, that it might not be possible to identify the set of frames
needed to interpret an observed choice as framed with the states that generated it. For
an extreme example, if x and y have the same properties and there is a single state, we
still need at least two frames to generate, for example, the choice c ({x, y}) = {x, y}.
This discrepancy would not go away even if we extended the frame model to allow for
multivalued choices in each state, for reasons similar to those explaining the discrep-
ancy between menu dependent utility maximisation and menu driven state dependent
choice. For example, if x and y are as above, they will always appear together in any
choice (since they must be ‘indifferent’ in any state), but one could instead define a
frame in which x is ranked above y. So, at the conceptual level, the state dependence
model remains distinct from the frame model. If states or frames could be observed,
or if at least the choices corresponding to each state/frame could be observed, the two
models could be easily told apart.
Finally, note that even the choice-observational correspondence between choice by
salient considerations and environmental states is due to our assumption that proper-
ties are satisfied in a 0− 1 fashion (together with the bridging result of MMM [40]).
For example, in a variation of our model in which each property can be satisfied in
various degrees represented by a partial order (i.e. a ‘state dependent’ version of our
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[42] model of choice by lexicographic semiorder) the correspondence would be lost.
6.3 Distinguishing state dependent from indecisive behaviour
Distinguishing between the psychological reasons that motivate behaviour is important
in many economic contexts. In this section we compare state dependence with an
important psychological driver, indecisiveness (Eliaz and Ok [18], Mandler [39]). In-
decisiveness is conceived by Eliaz and Ok and Mandler as the lack of either a strict
preference or an indifference.
A simple property characterises the choice behaviour of indecisive agents in Eliaz
and Ok’s [18] model:
WARNI (Weak Axiom of Revealed Non-Inferiority): If in a menu A there is an alter-
native x that is chosen, possibly from different menus, in the presence of each alterna-
tive in A, then x should be chosen from A. Formally, for all A, B ∈ Σ:
[∀y ∈ A ∃B ∈ Σ such that x ∈ c (B) , y ∈ B]⇒ x ∈ c (A).
Eliaz and Ok assume that the agent maximises an incomplete preference relation,
and thus interpret the fact that x ∈ c (B) and y ∈ B as revealing the non-inferiority of x
compared to y (though not necessarily its superiority). This suits a situation in which
an agent is undecided, rather than indifferent, between two alternatives (in which case
he cannot rank them). It is easy to see that both our models of state dependent be-
haviour have different empirical predictions from Eliaz and Ok’s model of indecisive-
ness. Call a c that satisfies WARNI but not WARP an indecisive choice.
Claim 2 There are (multivalued) menu driven state dependent choices that are not indeci-
sive,17 and vice-versa. Similarly, there are (multivalued) environment driven state dependent
choices that are not indecisive, and vice-versa.
Other comparisons that it would be interesting to make are with the psychological
phenomena of inattention (Masatlioglu et al. [46]), categorisation (Manzini and Mariotti
[43]) and rationalisation (Cherepanov et al. [11]). However, all these theories, while
axiomatised, are formulated for single-valued choices, whereas ours is crucially pred-
icated on multiple observations of choice from menus. Therefore, pending a gener-
alisation of those theories to choice correspondences, only the following basic claim
can be made: there are menu driven state dependent choices that cannot be explained
17The claim is trivial for single-valued state dependent choices.
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by inattention, categorisation or inattention, and not viceversa (menu driven state de-
pendent choice is unrestrictive when single-valued) and there are choices driven by
inattention, categorisation and rationalisation that are not environment driven state
dependent choices, and not viceversa (sd-WARP reduces to WARP in the single-valued
case).
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed a versatile framework to study the dependence of
choices on psychological states. The language of properties we have adopted allows
one to talk about such states in a more nuanced way, and with more direct psycho-
logical interpretations, than the language of utility. The framework can accommodate
much non-standard behaviour, yet we have shown that it is not empirically vacuous.
‘Psychological’ theories of choice that use primitives different from a standard util-
ity function face a potential problem: namely, that it’s hard to tell precisely how dif-
ferent they are from the textbook model.18 While this problem may be legitimately
addressed in various ways, we have found it useful to address it through an axiomatic
characterisation. In this way we have (a) pinned down the precise regularities in choice
behaviour implied by the state swings of our framework - generating testable impli-
cations on choice data - and (b) located our models in the ‘logical space’ of standard
revealed preference axioms, facilitating comparison both with the textbook model and
with other psychological theories of choice. Our models are, in a sense made precise,
‘between’ the standard model and certain weakened versions of it. In addition, the
models are tractable: with appropriate restrictions, a rich set of specific economic im-
plications can be derived.
In both models we have considered, the idea at the heart of their testability and
distinctiveness is that an observer can garner data on multiple choices from the same
menu (with single-valued observations, our first model would be empirically vacu-
ous and our second model would reduce to the standard utility maximisation model).
These multiple observations of choice from a menu can be taken literally, as for a con-
sumer observed to pick different items from a shelf in different shopping days, taxi
drivers choosing different hours of work in different days at the same daily wage, or
experimental subjects approving multiple options. We hope that our results will spur
18See e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer [25] for a surprising application of the revealed preference method to
a psychological model.
26
the collection of this type of data. But multiple observations of choice can also be
interpreted as deriving from a (possibly estimated) stochastic choice function. In this
case, the choosable alternatives in c (A) can be interpreted for example as all those al-
ternatives that are chosen with positive probability, or as those that are chosen with
maximum probability, or any of the intermediate possibilities. Then, depending on the
specific connection made between deterministic and stochastic choice function, our
characterisation results for the deterministic model will translate into different restric-
tions on the probabilistic one.19 Obviously, the data needed to test our theory are less
demanding than the collection of stochastic choice data - we just need to tell whether an
alternative is choosable, without worrying about the precise frequency -, yet even the
latter can be collected without too much difficulty (see e.g. Caplin and Dean [9] for a
recent design that even elicits state-dependent stochastic choices).
In practice, a state is not entirely unpredictable: psychological research may help
to identify correlations between environmental and personal variables with states, and
states with choice, so that additional elements of predictability in choice can be identi-
fied. For example, in the taxi driver application of section 5.1, one might conjecture a
relationship between weather and psychological state, so that weather could be used
as an observable proxy for states (or, conversely, one could use choice data to infer a
connection between choice and state, conditional on the theory being valid). Our con-
tribution has been to identify what can be predicted exclusively in terms of an economic
choice model.
While a psychological state affects choice, undoubtedly choice affects the psycho-
logical state, too. There is a subtle two-way interaction between psychological states
and choices. At present it is not clear how this interaction can be modelled, yet some
progress has been made.20 Our paper is a first step towards the formal modelling of
state dependent choice behaviour.
19A classical technical treatment of the relationship between deterministic choice correspondences
and stochastic choice functions is Fishburn [23].
20See for example, Dalton and Ghosal [13], who resolve the interaction through an elegant equilibrium
analysis, and Dillenberger and Rozen [16], where disappointment and elation are moods that affect risk
aversion, and are determined endogenously based on how risk unfolds over time (generating a history
of disappointment and elation states).
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Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. We show the following: let c and d be two choice functions
on Σ that have, respectively the sd-cheklists
(
Γ, {<A}A∈Σ
)
and
(
Γ,
{
<′A
}
A∈Σ
)
; then
c = d.
Suppose that c (A) 6= d (A) for some A ∈ Σ and in particular let (possibly relabeling
the choice functions) x ∈ c (A) and x /∈ d (A). The latter implies that there exist y ∈ A
and P ∈ Γ such that x /∈ P and y ∈ P. For x ∈ c (A) it must then be the case that there
exists Q <A P and z ∈ A such that y /∈ Q and z ∈ Q. If P ⊂ Q this is incompatible
with y ∈ P, and if Q ⊂ P then x /∈ Q. Therefore x /∈ SA(Q,<A) and x /∈ c (A), a
contradiction.
So any sequence of the properties in the mindset Γ generates the same behaviour
and by Proposition 1 the behaviour generated by any particular sequence maximises a
weak order, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that c satisfies Togetherness. Define a relation ≈ on
X by x ≈ y iff there is no A ∈ Σ such that x ∈ c (A) and y ∈ A\c (A) or y ∈ c (A) and
x ∈ A\c (A). The relation ≈ is obviously reflexive and symmetric. To see that it is also
transitive, suppose that x ≈ y ≈ z and that x ∈ c (A) and z ∈ A for some A ∈ Σ. We
show that z ∈ c (A).
Since x ≈ y we have x ∈ c ({x, y, z}) if and only if y ∈ c ({x, y, z}) ({x, y, z} is in the
domain by assumption), and similarly y ≈ z implies that y ∈ c ({x, y, z}) if and only
if z ∈ c ({x, y, z}). Therefore if x ∈ c ({x, y, z}) then c ({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}. There-
fore by Togetherness x ∈ c (A) and z ∈ A imply z ∈ A. If instead x /∈ c ({x, y, z}),
then c ({x, y, z}) = ∅, a contradiction. ≈ is therefore an equivalence relation and
it partitions the set of alternatives into equivalence classes, which we denote [x] =
{y ∈ X : y ≈ x}.
Given A ∈ Σ, take any x ∈ c (A) and let PA = [x]. Note that PA is uniquely
defined, and let the mindset be Γ = {PA : A ∈ Σ}. Since ≈ is an equivalence, we have
PA ∩ PB = ∅ for all distinct menus A, B ∈ Σ. Let the state <A be any linear order for
which PA <A P for all P ∈ Γ\PA. Then A ∩ PA = c (A) (for any y /∈ c (A) and x ∈ PA
it cannot be y ≈ x by the definitions of ≈ and PA). And since for all P ∈ Γ\PA we have
PA ∩ P = ∅, it follows that, for all P ∈ Γ, SA (P,<A) = c (A).
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Conversely, let
{
Γ, {<A}A∈Σ
}
be a menu checklist for c. Suppose x, y ∈ c (A) for
some A ∈ Σ, and suppose by contradiction that, for some B ∈ Σ, y ∈ c (B) and
x ∈ B\c (B). Then there exists P ∈ Γ such that y ∈ P and x /∈ P. By definition of
having a checklist there exists Q ∈ Γ such that SA (Q) = SA (R) for all R ∈ Γ with
Q <A R. This cannot be true if Q <A P. On the other hand, if P <A Q it cannot be
x, y ∈ c (A), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4: If x ∈ γ (B,<m) then x must be in any SB(P,<m), and there-
fore in any SA(P,<m), so that x ∈ γ (A,<m) whenever x ∈ A: so γ (B,<m) ∩ A ⊆
γ (A,<m). And if x /∈ γ (B,<m) and γ (B,<m) ∩ A 6= ∅, then there exists y ∈
γ (B,<m) ∩ A that has a property which x does not have. So there is P for which x /∈
SA(P,<m), and consequently x /∈ γ (A,<m). This shows that γ (A,<m) ⊆ γ (B,<m) ∩
A, and we conclude that γ (A,<m) = γ (B,<m) ∩ A.
Proof of Claim 1 Let Γ = {P, Q, R}, M = {<m,<n}, P <m Q <m R and R <n Q <n P.
Suppose P = {x, z}, Q = {y, z} and R = {x, y}. Then
γ ({x, y} ,<m) = {x}
γ ({x, z} ,<m) = {z}
γ ({x, y} ,<n) = {y}
γ ({x, z} ,<n) = {x}
and therefore
c ({x, y}) = {x, y}
c ({x, z}) = {x, z} But
γ ({x, y, z} ,<m) = {z}
γ ({x, y, z} ,<n) = {y}
so that c ({x, y, z}) = {y, z}. We conclude that c violates both Expansion and Property
β.
Proof of Proposition 6. We will find it convenient to write sd-WARP in an equivalent
way:21
sd-WARP (restated): c (A) ⊆ B⇒ c (B) ∩ A ⊆ c (A).22
Necessity. As a preliminary, we say that ‘x m−tops y’, written xTmy, if there is a
21To see this, let sd-WARP hold, and suppose that C (A) ⊂ B but that in contradiction there exists
some x such that x ∈ (C (B) ∩ A) \C (A). Since C (A) ⊂ B and x ∈ A\C (A), sd-WARP requires
x /∈ C (B), contradiction. For the other direction, let sd-WARP (restated) hold, and suppose that x ∈
A\C (A), C (A) ⊂ B but that in contradiction x ∈ C (B). Then x ∈ (C (B) ∩ A) \C (A), an immediate
contradiction of sd-WARP (restated).
22A small choice theoretic observation: this formulation makes it clear that sd-WARP is a stronger
version of the classic axiom by Aizerman (see Aizerman and Malishevski [2]), which adds to the premise
in sd-WARP the requirement that the sets A and B are nested, i.e. B ⊂ A.
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state <m and a property Pi such that x ∈ Pi, y /∈ Pi and y ∈ Pj ⇒ x ∈ Pj for all Pj such
that Pj <m Pi. Observe that for all D ∈ Σ and <m∈ M, x ∈ γ (D,<m) only if there is no
y ∈ D such that yTmx.
Let A, B ∈ Σ be such that c (A) ⊆ B. The statement of the proposition is trivially
true if A ∩ γ (B,<m) = ∅ for all <m∈ M (in which case A ∩ c (B) = ∅), so suppose
that A ∩ γ (B,<m) 6= ∅ for some <m∈ M. Then
A ∩ c (B) = A ∩ ⋃
<m∈M
γ (B,<m)
=
⋃
<m∈M
A ∩ γ (B,<m) ⊆
⋃
<m∈M
γ (A,<m)
= c (A)
where the inclusion is proved with the following reasoning. Since c (A) ⊆ B, for all
<m∈ M we have γ (A,<m) ⊆ B. So in particular there is no y ∈ A\B that m−tops
any x ∈ γ (A,<m). Therefore for all x ∈ γ (B,<m) ∩ A we also have x ∈ γ (A,<m)
(if not, there would exist y ∈ A\B with yTmx). We conclude that, for all <m∈ M,
γ (B,<m) ∩ A ⊆ γ (A,<m), from which the desired inclusion follows.
Sufficiency. Let sd-WARP hold. We construct an environmental checklist explicitly,
then show that it retrieves c (A) for each menu A ∈ Σ. Let Γ = {{x}x∈X}, and let
|X| = n.
An a−path is a sequence a = {xi}i=1,...n of distinct alternatives x1, x2, ...xn defined
recursively as follows. x1 ∈ c (X) and, for all i > 1, xi ∈ c (X\ {x1, ..., xi−1}). Denote
by α the collection of a−paths, and note that each a−path covers all of the alternatives
in X . Construct M by setting, for each a ∈ α:
{xi} <a
{
xj
}
if and only if i < j and xi, xj ∈ a
We now show that this construction retrieves choice.
Fix an arbitrary menu A ∈ Σ, let x ∈ c (A), and suppose by contradiction that for
each<m∈ M, there is an alternative w such that {w} <m {x}. For each<m let {ym} de-
note the<m −maximal property in A, that is {ym} <m {z} for all z ∈ A\ {ym}. By con-
struction we have that ym ∈ γ (Am,<m) where Am = {ym} ∪ {z ∈ X : {ym} <m {z}}.
Observe that by assumption there is no <m such that x ∈ γ (Am,<m) (otherwise {x}
would be maximal in A for some state). Moreover, by construction it must also be that
A ⊆ Am, for otherwise it would not be true that {ym} <m {z} for all z ∈ A\ {ym}.
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If for any of the Am it is the case that c (Am) ⊆ A, then by sd-WARP it would fol-
low that c (A) ∩ Am ⊆ c (Am), contradicting x /∈ γ (Am,<m). So suppose not, so
that c (Am) \A 6= ∅, and consider Am1 = Am\ {z1} where z1 ∈ c (Am) \A. As be-
fore, either c (Am1) ⊆ A, so that the contradiction c (A) ∩ Am1 ⊆ c (Am1) follows; or
c (Am1) \A 6= ∅. More in general, proceed recursively setting Amj = Amj−1\
{
zj
}
where zj ∈ c
(
Amj
) \A whenever c (Amj) \A 6= ∅ and j > 1. At each step either
c
(
Amj
) ⊆ A, implying c (A) ∩ Amj ⊆ c (Amj); or c (Amj) \A 6= ∅. Since X is finite
there exists a j∗ such that c
(
Amj∗
) \A = ∅, generating the desired contradiction.
Suppose now that x ∈ A\c (A), and that in contradiction there exists some state
<m∈ M such that x ∈ γ (A,<m). By construction it must be that x ∈ c (B) where
B = {x} ∪ {y ∈ X : {x} <m {y}}, and that A ⊆ B. If A = B we have an immediate
contradiction. Otherwise, then c (A) ⊂ B, so that by sd-WARP c (B) ∩ A ⊆ c (A) also
follows, implying x ∈ c (A), a contradiction.
Proof of Claim 2. By example:
Example 4 (Menu driven state dependent but not indecisive) c ({x, y, z}) = {x, y}, c ({x, y}) =
{x, y}, c ({x, z}) = {x}, c ({y, z}) = {z}.
Example 5 (Environment driven state dependent but not indecisive) c ({x, y, z}) = {x, y},
c ({x, y}) = {x, y}, c ({x, z}) = {x, z}, c ({y, z}) = {y, z}.
Example 6 (Indecisive but neither menu driven state dependent nor environment driven state
dependent) c ({x, y, z}) = {y}, c ({x, y}) = {x, y}, c ({x, z}) = {z}, c ({y, z}) = {y}.
B Examples
B.1 Property α is not sufficient for environment driven state depen-
dent choice
Suppose c ({x, y, z}) = {x} and c ({x, y, w}) = {x, y}. Although these two choices
do not violate Property α, it is not possible to find a mindset Γ, a set of states M and a
choice function γ such that
c (A) =
⋃
<m∈M
γ (A,<m)
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To see this, suppose to the contrary that y ∈ γ ({x, y, w} ,<m) for some m ∈ M. Since
y /∈ c ({x, y, z}), it must be that there is an alternative i ∈ {x, y, z} such that i ∈ Pi,
y /∈ Pi and y ∈ Pj ⇒ i ∈ Pj for all Pj such that Pj <m Pi. If i = x, then it could not be
that y ∈ γ ({x, y, w} ,<m); while if i = z, then either x /∈ γ ({x, y, w} ,<m), or it must
be that z ∈ c ({x, y, z}). In either case we have a contradiction.
B.2 sd-WARP implies Property α
Let sd-WARP hold, and suppose that there are sets A and B such that A ⊂ B but that
in contradiction to Property α there is some x ∈ C (B) ∩ A such that x /∈ C (A). Since
A ⊂ B it also follows that C (A) ⊂ B, which together with x ∈ A\C (A) and sd-WARP
implies x /∈ c (B), contradiction.
B.3 Independence of the two state dependent choice models
The models we have considered in the paper (menu and environment driven states) are
logically independent. We illustrate this with a simple example.23 Let A = {hs, hL, us}
and B = A ∪ {uL}, where hi and ui stand for healthy and unhealthy food items, with
the index 1 denoting a smaller portion than index 2. Let c1 (A) = c2 (A) = {hs, hL},
c1 (B) = {us, uL} and c2 (B) = {hL, uL}. Then cs is menu driven but not environment
driven state dependent (Togetherness holds and sd-WARP fails), while c2 is environ-
ment driven but not menu driven state dependent (sd-WARP holds and Togetherness
fails). The states for cs could be e.g. {hs, hL} <A {us, uL} and {us, uL} <B {hs, hL}, in
line with the explanation that the decision maker can stick to healthy food when they
are the majority, but adding an extra unhealthy food item switches the state to ‘glut-
tony’. And for c2 we could have {hs, hL} <c {hL, uL} <c {uL}when the decision maker
is in a cool state, and sticks to his diet; while in a depressed state he seeks satisfaction
in large portion sizes, e.g. {uL} <d {hs, hL} <d {hL, uL}.
23This example is loosely based upon B. Wansink (1994) ‘Antecedents and mediators of eating Bouts’,
Family and Consumer Sciences Research Journal, 23(2): 166–182, who studies the determinants of ‘eating
bouts’. An eating bout is a splurge on food that is some multiple (three times the usual amount in
this study). Both external cues (i.e. menu composition) and internal states (i.e. moods) are invoked as
alternative triggers for such eating bouts.
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C An alternative characterisation of menu driven state
dependent choice
A slightly different angle on the behavioural restriction of menu driven state depen-
dent choice is the following:
All or Nothing: If the choices from two different menus overlap, then the choice from
one menu consists of those available alternatives that are chosen from the other menu.
Formally, for all A, B ∈ Σ: c (A) ∩ c (B) 6= ∅⇒ c (A) ∩ c (B) = c (A) ∩ B.
All or Nothing describes either a form of ‘behavioural discontinuity’ or of ‘be-
havioural inertia’, excluding other possibilities. That is, when moving from a menu
A to a different menu B, either the agent’s behaviour changes abruptly (no alterna-
tive is chosen from both menus) or whatever was originally chosen in A and is still
available in B, it remains chosen, and no new alternatives are added to the choice.24
Corollary 1 A choice function is a menu driven state dependent choice if and only if it satisfies
All or Nothing.
Proof. We show the equivalence of Togetherness and All or Nothing. Suppose that
Togetherness holds and that c (A)∩ c (B) 6= ∅. Obviously for any x ∈ c (A)∩ c (B) we
have x ∈ c (A)∩ B, that is c (A)∩ c (B) ⊆ c (A)∩ B. For the converse inclusion, for any
x ∈ c (A)∩ B either c (A)∩ c (B) = {x} or there exists y 6= x with y ∈ c (A)∩ c (B) and
so by Togetherness x ∈ c (B) (otherwise, x ∈ B\c (B)would violate Togetherness). This
shows that c (A) ∩ B ⊆ c (A) ∩ c (B) and we conclude that c (A) ∩ c (B) = c (A) ∩ B.
Conversely, suppose that Togetherness is violated, that is there exist A, B ∈ Σ and
x ∈ A\c (A), y ∈ c (A), y ∈ c (B) but x ∈ c (B). Then c (A) ∩ c (B) 6= ∅. Moreover,
x /∈ c (A) ∩ c (B) while x ∈ c (B) ∩ A, so that c (A) ∩ c (B) 6= c (B) ∩ A, violating All or
Nothing.
24Contrast again the restriction imposed by All or Nothing with that imposed by WARP, which can
be written as A ∩ c (B) 6= ∅⇒ c (A) ∩ c (B) = c (A) ∩ B (the same conclusion of All or Nothing from a
weaker premise).
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D A technical remark on the relation of Proposition 6
with a theorem by Litvakov
We establish a connection with a not very well-known result by Litvakov [37], asserting
that if a choice function c satisfies Property α and Chernoff’s Postulate 5 (if c(B) ⊆ A ⊆
B then c(A) = c(B)),then it can be expressed as the union of choice correspondences
ci (i.e. c (A) = ∪ic (A) for all A), each of which satisfies IIA. Because Litvakov [37]
is written in Russian, a more useful general reference is Aizerman and Aleskerov [1],
Theorem 5.6(b) (and Theorem 5.2.1 for the other direction).
The following result can be proved (details available from the authors):
Claim 3 A choice function c satisfies sd-WARP if and only if it satisfies Property αand Cher-
noff’s Postulate 5.
Then, it can be seen that Proposition 6 can also be derived indirectly as the com-
bined consequence of Litvakov’s theorem, the above claim, and Proposition 1 in this
paper.
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